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The Constitution of South Africa provides for a single, independent national prosecution authority. The office of the 
National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) was formally established through the National Prosecuting Authority Act on 1 
August 1998, replacing the former provincial Attorneys-General. The Constitution provides that the NPA has the 
power to institute and conduct criminal proceedings on behalf of the state; carry out any necessary functions 
incidental to instituting and conducting such criminal proceedings, and discontinue criminal proceedings. 
Twenty years into democracy, the independence of the NPA, in particular the National Director of Public Prosecutions 
(NDPP), has become a highly contested and politicised issue. The Constitutional Court has noted that ‘[t]he 
constitutional obligation upon the State to prosecute those offences which threaten or infringe the rights of citizens is 
of central importance in our constitutional framework’. 
This report focuses on the substantive problems and dilemmas facing the NPA. In the discussion that follows the 
major challenges that the NPA is facing and have faced are set out. The report unpacks these and presents possible 
solutions and recommendations.  
The first issue dealt with is the independence of the NPA and NDPP as it relates to the dismissal and appointment of 
the NDPP and it is argues that the process lacks transparency. Moreover, the lack of a transparent selection and 
appointment process has raised concerns about the ‘fit and proper’ requirement for the position of NDPP and other 
senior positions in the NPA. Interference by the executive in the work of the NPA has also emerged as a concern. 
The second issue dealt with is the accountability of the NPA and NDPP with reference to general proceedings and 
decisions to prosecute or not. Accountability is also examined in the light of the Prosecution Policy and Prosecution 
Directives. 
Thirdly, the question is raised whether the NPA is effective in holding offenders accountable. Data is presented that 
the institution’s performance is on a steady decline in pursuit of a high conviction rate, raising question about 
efficiency and effectiveness.  
Recommendations are presented in relation to independence, accountability and performance. 
Independence 
• Amend the NPA Act to require judicial review of controversial decisions 
• The Constitution should be amended to remove ministerial control and to diffuse the power of the NDPP on a 
geographic basis. 
• Reform the selection and appointment process of the NDPP and other senior officials to set higher 




• Prosecution policy and directives should be reviewed to ensure that all persons are equally subject to 
prosecution. Requirements for authorisation to prosecute should be counterbalanced by authorisations to 
withdraw or not charge, whenever there is a prima facie case.  
• Alternative Disputes resolution, which is used widely, should be regulated and practised in a transparent 
manner. 
• Accountability to Parliament in respect of record-keeping systems and expenditure should be strengthened. 
Performance 
• Parliament should require detailed reporting, particularly in relation to offences involving violence, and on 
the extent to which prosecution has successfully targeted repeat offenders or offenders posing a risk to 
society. 
• The internal performance management system of the NPA requires review as there is currently little in place 




1 Introduction  
Independent, accountable and effective – these are the three key characteristics required of a prosecution service for 
a criminal justice system to operate justly and successfully. The pivotal role of the prosecution in any criminal justice 
system demands the prosecution service to provide neutral, non-political, non-arbitrary decision-making about the 
application of criminal law and policy to real cases.
1
 In South Africa, the National Director of Public Prosecutions 
(NDPP) has high political status
2
 and wields considerable power, but is subject to limited oversight. This creates a 
number of risks, which are the focus of this report.  
Finding the right balance between independence and accountability is the central challenge in ensuring just and 
effective operations.
3
 Failures in independence and accountability in turn negatively influence effectiveness. The 
need for prosecutors in nation states to be both independent and accountable in carrying out their role is increasingly 
recognised in international instruments such as the United Nations (UN) Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors,
4
 but 
these tend to stop short of imposing binding commitments on nation states.  
The Constitution of South Africa provides for a single, independent national prosecution authority.
5
 The office of the 
National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) was formally established through the National Prosecuting Authority Act on 1 
August 1998, replacing the former provincial Attorneys-General. The Constitution provides that the NPA has the 
power to institute and conduct criminal proceedings on behalf of the state; carry out any necessary functions 
incidental to instituting and conducting such criminal proceedings, and discontinue criminal proceedings.
6
  
Both the Constitution and the legislation appear to entrust the NPA with considerable discretion to prosecute or not. 
Furthermore, the NDPP, after consultation with the Minister of Justice, writes the Prosecution Policy, and the NDPP 
alone writes the detailed Prosecution Directives with which all prosecutors must comply.
7
  
In the past ten years the NPA has come under increasing criticism for a number of reasons, including its poor 
performance, as evidenced by the low percentage, and declining number, of cases being prosecuted;
8
 its lack of 
                                                          
1
 Waters, T. (2008) ‘Design and reform of public prosecution services’ in Promoting Prosecutorial Independence, Accountability 
and Effectiveness: Comparative research, Sofia: Open Society Institute, p. 25. 
2
 Du Plessis, A., Redpath, J. and Schönteich, M. (2008) ‘Report on the South African National Prosecuting Authority’ in Promoting 
Prosecutorial Accountability, Independence and Effectiveness, Sofia: Open Society Institute, p. 353. 
3
 Schönteich, M. (2014) Strengthening Prosecutorial Accountability in South Africa, ISS Paper 255, p. 3. 
4
 Adopted by the Eighth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August – 7 
September 1990.  
5
 Section 179 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
6
 S 179(2) Constitution. 
7
 S 179(5)(a) and (b), respectively.  
8
 Redpath J. (2012) Failing to Prosecute? Assessing the State of the National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa, Pretoria: 
Institute for Security Studies, ISS Monograph 186. 
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accountability and the difficulty in reviewing its decisions not to investigate or prosecute;
9
 and the politicisation of 
the institution and its perceived or real lack of independence.
10
  
Twenty years into democracy, the independence of the NPA, in particular the NDPP, has become a highly contested 
and politicised issue. Whereas initially there may have been concerns that the NDPP might target political opponents 
of the ruling party, in recent times the concern is perhaps more so that prosecutions are not being undertaken 
against allies of the ruling party, and that, furthermore, the review of such decisions is being resisted in a methodical 
and litigious manner. The Constitutional Court has noted that ‘[t]he constitutional obligation upon the State to 




Given this tension between constitutional imperatives and the NDPP’s considerable discretion, the accountability of 
the NDPP and NPA needs to be enhanced, while at the same time maintaining their necessary independence of office. 
The core issue can thus be described as centring on the question of balancing independence with oversight and 
accountability; imbalances in this regard have led to the various problems that afflict the NPA. These were concisely 
identified in research done in 2007: 
[S]everal serious challenges still remain, including: poor court performance, a growing backlog of cases, low 
prosecution rates, growing numbers of sentenced prisoners and prisoners awaiting trial, the need to maintain 
positive public perceptions, clarifying the role and positioning of its elite crime fighting unit, the Directorate of Special 
Operations, allegations of criminality among its own members, high staff turnover, and the need to deal with the 
consequences of complex and politically sensitive investigations into high-profile political figures.
12
 
This report will not describe the structure and distribution of functions in the NPA, as it has been done already more 
than adequately in the extant literature.
13
 The aim instead is to focus on the substantive problems and dilemmas 
facing the NPA. In the discussion that follows the major challenges that the NPA is facing and have faced are set out. 
The aim is to unpack these with a view to develop possible solutions and recommendations. Detailed 
recommendations follow the review of the situation.  
                                                          
9
 Democratic Alliance and Others v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others (288/11) [2012] ZASCA 15; 2012 (3) 
SA 486 (SCA); [2012] 2 All SA 345 (SCA); 2012 (6) BCLR 613 (SCA) (20 March 2012) and subsequent decisions following from this 
matter; Southern African Litigation Centre and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others (77150/09) [2012] 
ZAGPPHC 61; 2012 (10) BCLR 1089 (GNP); [2012] 3 All SA 198 (GNP) (8 May 2012). 
10
 See, for example, ‘NPA probe should assess whether Zuma is to blame for the mess’ Mail & Guardian, 25 July 2014, 
http://mg.co.za/article/2014-07-24-npa-probe-should-assess-whether-zuma-is-to-blame-for-the-mess.  
11
 S v Basson [2004] (6) BCLR 620 (CC), 32.  
12
 Du Plessis, A., Redpath, J. and Schönteich, M. (2008) ‘Report on the South African National Prosecuting Authority’ in Promoting 
Prosecutorial Accountability, Independence and Effectiveness, Sofia: Open Society Institute, p. 346. 
13
 Redpath J. (2012) Failing to Prosecute? Assessing the State of the National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa, Pretoria: 
Institute for Security Studies, ISS Monograph 186. Du Plessis, A., Redpath, J. and Schönteich, M. (2008) ‘Report on the South 
African National Prosecuting Authority’ in Promoting Prosecutorial Accountability, Independence and Effectiveness, Sofia: Open 
Society Institute. Govender, K. (2013) ‘Power and constraints in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa’, African Human 
Rights Law Journal, No. 13, pp. 82-102. De Villiers, W.P. (2011) ‘Is the Prosecuting Authority under South African law politically 
independent? An investigation into the South African and analogous models’, Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg, 
No. 74, pp. 247-263. Mokoena, T. (2012) ‘Taming the prosecutorial beast: Of independence, discretion and accountability’, 
Stellenbosch Law Review, No. 2. Schönteich, M. (2014) Strengthening prosecutorial accountability in South Africa, ISS paper 255.  
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2 The role of the prosecution  
It is a truism that the prosecutor’s ‘primary function is to assist the court in arriving at a just verdict’.
14
 In criminal 
trials, the role of the prosecutor involves the exercise of a great deal of discretion, including decisions about 
instituting criminal proceedings; withdrawing charges or stopping prosecutions; whether or not to oppose bail; which 
crimes to charge an accused with and in what court; whether a case should be diverted; whether or not to accept a 
guilty plea; which evidence to present at trial; which evidence to present during sentencing proceedings; and whether 
or not to appeal a question of law, a sentence, the granting of bail, or to seek a review of proceedings.
15
 
Although South Africa’s prosecution policy holds that prosecutors represent the community in criminal trials
16
 – and 
hence in taking the decisions above – prosecutors are neither elected by the public, nor can they be removed by it, 
given that they are public servants. The public holds little sway, if any, over prosecutors as they account to the 
hierarchy of the NPA and have to comply with general conditions of employment and performance requirements.
17
 
They are bound only by law and by prosecution policy and directives, making their independence and impartiality in 
exercising their discretion crucial to the just operation of the criminal justice system.  
3 Independence  
Succinctly put, ‘[a]n accused has a constitutional right to a prosecution that is independent from political influence’.
18
 
Prosecutorial independence in South Africa is usually assumed to relate to independence from the executive arm of 
government, even though this is not an international norm; in many Anglo-Saxon countries the head of the 
prosecution service was or is also a minister in the cabinet.
19
 As the executive government is the most powerful force 
in South African society, and given the country’s history surrounding political prosecutions under apartheid, concerns 
about prosecutorial independence usually relate to inappropriate influence by the executive. However, prosecutorial 
independence should be understood more broadly than only independence from political influence by the executive; 
it entails independence from inappropriate influence of any kind, including that by the government, a political party, 
the media or public opinion.  
Independence refers to both internal and external independence; it refers, that is to say, to the independence of 
individual prosecutors and the independence of the institution vis-à-vis other arms of the state, in particular to the 
                                                          
14
 S v Jija and Others 1991 (2) SA 52 (E). 
15
 NPA (2013) Prosecution Policy, p. 4. 
16
 NPA (2014) Prosecution Policy, p. 4. 
17
 For examples from other jurisdictions, see UNODC (2014) The Status and Role of Prosecutors – A United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime and International Association of Prosecutors Guide, New York: United Nations, pp. 14-15. 
18
 De Villiers, W.P. (2011) ‘Is the Prosecuting Authority under South African law politically independent? An investigation into the 
South African and analogous models’, Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg, No. 74, pp. 248. See also s 35(3) 
Constitution. 
19
 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma (573/08) [2009], Supreme Court of Appeal, para. 28. 
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impermissibility of the executive instructing the prosecution in individual cases.
20
 In post-1994 South Africa, what has 
been cause for concern is independence from the executive and from political factions within the ruling party of the 
executive. This is largely because of the unusual situation, though not an unprecedented one,
21
 in which a 
presidential presumptive, and now sitting President, faces potential prosecution for serious crimes, prosecution he 
has strenuously resisted for almost a decade.  
3.1 Independence from the executive: Legislative history  
The legislative independence of the prosecuting authority from the executive government has changed significantly 
over the past one hundred years. Until 1926, the four provincial Attorneys-General, as they were known, were free 
from legislated political control and had absolute autonomy. However, the government of J.B.M. Hertzog, successor 
to Smuts, brought an end to this and placed the Attorneys-General under the direct control of the Minister of 
Justice.
22
 This was entrenched in a 1935 amendment that gave the Minister the authority to reverse any decision of 
an Attorney-General or Solicitor-General.
23
 During this period there was fundamentally no separation of powers 
between the national executive and the Attorneys-General.
24
  
The situation prevailed until 1992, when an amendment introduced by the De Klerk government removed the 
Minister’s power to interfere in the decision-making of the Attorneys-General.
25
 The African National Congress (ANC) 
regarded the amendment with some suspicion, viewing it as an attempt by the ‘old order prosecutors to protect their 
entrenched positions’.
26
 As a result, the provisions introduced by the Constitutional Assembly in the Final Constitution 
may be seen to some extent as a reaction to the 1992 amendments. They (the provisions in the Final Constitution) 
provided for a national Director of Public Prosecutions – to be appointed by the national executive – who has final say 
over decisions to prosecute or not, and over prosecution policy and prosecution directives.  
There was, however, an objection to the introduction of a single national prosecuting authority, one that was raised 
during the certification process of the Constitution. The objection averred that a single national prosecution authority 
breached Constitutional Principle VI, which requires ‘separation of powers between the legislature, executive and 
                                                          
20
 Report on European standards as regards the independence of the judicial system: Part II – The Prosecution Service, Adopted by 
the Venice Commission at its 85th plenary session (Venice, 17-18 December 2010) CDL-Ad(2010) 040, para. 30. 
21
 Silvio Berlusconi and Park Geun-hye spring to mind. 
22
 Redpath J. (2012) Failing to Prosecute? Assessing the State of the National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa, Pretoria: 
Institute for Security Studies, ISS Monograph 186, p. 9. 
23
 Redpath, J. (2012) Failing to prosecute? Assessing the State of the National Prosecuting Authority in South Africa, Pretoria: 
Institute for Security Studies, ISS Monograph 186, p. 9. 
24
 Du Plessis, A., Redpath, J. and Schönteich, M. (2008) ‘Report on the South African National Prosecuting Authority’ in Promoting 
Prosecutorial Accountability, Independence and Effectiveness, Sofia: Open Society Institute, p. 344. 
25
 Redpath J. (2012) Failing to Prosecute? Assessing the State of the National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa, Pretoria: 
Institute for Security Studies, ISS Monograph 186, p. 10. 
26
 Redpath J. (2012) Failing to Prosecute? Assessing the State of the National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa, Pretoria: 
Institute for Security Studies, ISS Monograph 186, p. 10. 
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judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness’.
27
 It was 
argued that the breach arose because the NDPP is appointed by the President as head of the national executive.  
The Constitutional Court dealt swiftly with the objection, stating that 
[t]here is no substance in this contention. The prosecuting authority is not part of the judiciary and CP 
[Constitutional Principle] VI has no application to it. In any event, even if it were part of the judiciary, the mere 
fact that the appointment of the head of the national prosecuting authority is made by the President does not 
in itself contravene the doctrine of separation of powers.
28
 
The Court added that the Constitution requires national legislation to be in place to ensure that the NPA exercises its 
functions without fear, favour or prejudice. The Court thus concluded that there is a constitutional guarantee of 
independence and that ‘any legislation or executive action inconsistent therewith would be subject to constitutional 
control by the courts’.
29
 The Constitution guarantees the institutional and functional independence of the NPA to 
enable it to ‘exercise its functions without fear, favour or prejudice’ – the usual formulation for prosecutorial 
independence. 
30
 This is echoed in the NPA Act, in particular by section 32(1)(b) which prohibits any functionary in 
government from interfering in the work of the NPA.  
The history of the prosecuting authority shows that the issue of independence versus political control of the 
prosecution by the executive has shifted between extreme points. At the one extreme was the situation prior to 
1926, where there was absolute autonomy, and at the other, the situation between 1935 and 1992, during which the 
decisions of the Attorney General could be reversed by the national Minister. Each of these extremes reflected the 
prevailing paradigm of the ruling government rather than any considerations of effectiveness.  
In the post-1998 situation, the constitutional framework results in an NPA that falls somewhere in between these 
historical extremes. Thus there is now a single NDPP, which overrules provincial DPPs; there is national legislation 
that guarantees independence, yet at the same time it is the case that the President appoints the NDPP, who in turn 
determines prosecution policy after consulting the Minister. Furthermore, the NDPP determines the prosecution 
directives, on the basis of which he or she may intervene in prosecutions; the NDPP may also review decisions not to 
prosecute or decisions to prosecute, this after consulting the provincial DPPs; and finally, the Minister ‘exercises final 
responsibility over the prosecution authority’.
31
 The way in which this complex formulation of independence versus 
political control has played out in practice is the subject of the next section.  
                                                          
27
 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: in re certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 
1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), paras. 140-141. 
28
 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: in re certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 
1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), 1996 (CCT 23/96) [1996] ZACC 26; 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) (6 September 1996) para. 
141. 
29
 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: in re certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 
1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), 1996 (CCT 23/96) [1996] ZACC 26; 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) (6 September 1996) para. 
146. 
30
 S 179(4) Constitution. 
31
 S 179(6) Constitution.  
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3.2 Independence from the executive: The democratic era in practice  
In South Africa the President has the power both to appoint and remove the NDPP, although in the case of removal 
this must be done on limited specified grounds and the President must seek and obtain the concurrence of 
Parliament for dismissal on those grounds (see below). These appointment and removal provisions create the risk 
that the President will appoint a person who is unwilling, where necessary, to prosecute members of the executive or 
the ruling party, or persons politically connected to them; similarly, they create the risk that the President, with the 
concurrence of a Parliament dominated by the ruling party, will seek to remove an NDPP who is indeed willing to do 
so.  
Such risks have come to pass in South Africa. Not one NDPP has served his full term of ten years: during the past 18 
years, there have been five permanently appointed NDPPs and four acting NDPPs. In recent years, the lack of 
oversight over the decision not to prosecute has raised a great deal of controversy about the NPA’s motives and 
integrity, with these concerns arising from the fact that key appointments are made by the President.  
A potted history of the concerns regarding the independence of the NPA begins with the decision by NDPP Bulelani 
Ngcuka not to prosecute then Deputy President Jacob Zuma. Ngcuka resigned after then Public Protector Lawrence 
Mushwana, acting on a complaint from Zuma, said Ngcuka had undermined the dignity of Zuma when he told the 
media that, while there was ‘a prima facie case’ against the Deputy President, he would not be charged as the case 
could not be won.
32
 
During Ngcuka’s tenure, the struggle icon Alan Boesak and two senior ANC politicians, Winnie Madikizela-Mandela 
and party chief whip Tony Yengeni, were prosecuted. Some argued that these cases were not evidence of Ngcuka’s 
independence but a function of his close association with the Mbeki-oriented (anti-Zuma) faction of the ANC. Within 
a year of Ngcuka’s departure, Zuma was relieved of his duties as Deputy President in 2005 by President Mbeki after 
Zuma’s business associate Schabir Shaik was found guilty of corruption on the basis largely of his dealings with Zuma. 
Ngcuka’s wife, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, was subsequently appointed Deputy President in Zuma’s stead.  
Silas Ramaite was appointed Acting National Director in September 2004, a caretaker position he held for less than a 
year. Vusi Pikoli was then appointed in February 2005 by President Mbeki. In May 2006 Zuma was prosecuted and 
acquitted on a charge of rape. Pikoli charged Zuma on charges associated with the conviction of Shaik, charges that 
were dismissed in 2006 because the prosecution was not ready.  
In 2007 Pikoli also authorised a warrant of arrest for the then Commissioner of Police, Jackie Selebi, who was 
perceived as an Mbeki ally. Soon after the existence of the warrant became known, President Mbeki suspended Pikoli 
on 24 September 2007 on the basis of an ‘irretrievable breakdown’ in the relationship between Pikoli and the Justice 
Minister, Bridget Mabandla. Frene Ginwala, a former Speaker of the National Assembly, was appointed on 28 
September 2007 to head a Commission of Inquiry into Pikoli’s fitness to hold office. 
                                                          
32




Mokotedi Mpshe became Acting NDPP in 2007. On 27 December 2007 Zuma was recharged, via an 87-page 
indictment, shortly after he had been elected as president of the ANC at the party’s 2007 Polokwane conference. At 
this conference, Zuma defeated Mbeki for the leadership position of the ruling party.
33
 In May 2008, Leonard 
McCarthy, the head of the Scorpions, the investigative unit of the NPA responsible for the Zuma prosecution, 
resigned and left the country. 
 In September 2008 Judge Chris Nicholson in the High Court granted Zuma’s application to have the corruption 
charges against him dismissed, agreeing there were signs of a conspiracy. In September 2008 President Mbeki was 
‘recalled’ by the ANC; he resigned, and Kgalema Motlanthe served as President from 25 September 2008 to 9 May 
2009.  
In December 2008 Ginwala found that most of the allegations against Pikoli were unfounded, but that Pikoli should 
have agreed to Mbeki’s request that, on the basis of national security, he be given two weeks before proceeding 
against Selebi. On this basis, Mbeki’s caretaker successor, Motlanthe, refused to reinstate Pikoli as head of the NPA; 
meanwhile, Pikoli’s decision to prosecute Selebi had been justified by Selebi’s ultimate conviction and sentencing. In 
her findings, Ginwala had made negative findings around the then-Director-General of Justice, Menzi Simelane.
34
 
Acting NDPP Mpshe announced on 6 April 2009 that he had decided not to prosecute Jacob Zuma. This was in the 
light of allegations of abuse of process in the Zuma case, allegations arising out of leaked intelligence recordings of 
telephone conversations between former NPA head Bulelani Ngcuka and Leonard McCarthy, then head of the 
Scorpions and the person responsible for the proceedings against Zuma.  
The timing of Mpshe’s announcement not to prosecute Zuma removed the last obstacle to the Zuma presidency. On 
22 April 2009 the national election was held, with the ANC winning a majority at the polls. Zuma, as leader of the 
ANC, was elected by the National Assembly and inaugurated as President in May 2009. Zuma was never asked to 
plead and thus prosecution may still be instituted.  
At the end of November 2009, President Zuma appointed Menzi Simelane as NDPP a few days after Vusi Pikoli, on 
receipt of a settlement, withdrew his application for a nullification of his dismissal as NDPP. The opposition 
Democratic Alliance (DA) brought a case in which they claimed that Simelane was not a ‘fit and proper person’ to lead 
the NPA, making the claim on the basis of the evidence in the Ginwala Commission. Although it was unsuccessful at 
first, in October 2012 the case eventually succeeded in the Supreme Court of Appeal as well as the Constitutional 
Court. 
                                                          
33
 ‘A quick guide to the Jacob Zuma matter’ IDASA 2009, http://idasa.wordpress.com/2009/04/15/a-quick-guide-to-the-jacob-
zuma-matter/. 
34
 Ginwala Commission, paras. 320-321: ‘[320] I must express my displeasure at the conduct of the DG: Justice in the preparation 
of Government’s submissions and in his oral testimony which I found in many respects to be inaccurate or without any basis in 
fact and law. He was forced to concede during cross-examination that the allegations he made against Adv. Pikoli were without 
foundation. These complaints related to matters such as the performance agreement between the DG: Justice and the CEO of the 
NPA; the NPA’s plans to expand its corporate services division; the DSO dealing with its own labour relations issues; reporting on 
the misappropriation of funds from the Confidential Fund of the DSO; the acquisition of new office accommodation for NPA 
prosecutors; and the rationalisation of the NPA. [321] All these complaints against Adv. Pikoli were spurious, and are rejected 
without substance, and may have been motivated by personal issues.’ 
14 
 
Advocate Nomgcobo Jiba, a deputy NDPP said to be central to in-fighting at the NPA, served as acting NDPP from 
December 2011 until August 2013, when Mxolisi Nxasana was appointed by President Zuma as NDPP, effective from 1 
October 2013. Nxasana, having received a large settlement, agreed to step down from his position as NDPP on 31 
May 2015, effective from 1 June 2015, and an inquiry into his fitness to hold office was suspended. While there was 
some cloud over his criminal record, it was also suggested that Nxasana’s short tenure as NDPP were connected to his 
attempts to reinstate charges of murder, kidnapping and defeating the ends of justice against Crime Intelligence 
Head, Richard Mdluli.  
On 16 June 2015, Shaun Abrahams was appointed as NDPP. In October 2016 he apparently brought spurious charges 
against Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan and SA Revenue Service officials Ivan Pillay and Oupa Magushula. The 
charges were subsequently withdrawn.  
In 2016, a full bench of the North Gauteng High Court held that the decision of then acting NDPP Mokotedi Mpshe to 
drop corruption charges against Zuma was irrational – hence the charges against Zuma had to be reinstated. The 
judges refused to grant leave to appeal. The Supreme Court of Appeal granted Zuma the right to argue why leave 
should be granted and, if he were successful, why the order of the High Court should be set aside. This is to be heard 
on a date not yet set down in 2017.  
This brief history highlights only the most prominent issues relating to the NDPP’s independence and vulnerability to 
executive influence and perceived or actual partisan decision-making. Crucial to his or her vulnerability in this regard 
is the fact that the NDPP is appointed and dismissed by the President, in the latter instance with the concurrence of 
Parliament. This is considered in detail below.  
3.2.1 Executive appointment of the NDPP 
The Constitution and the NPA Act provide that the NDPP is appointed by the President,
35
 who may also, after 
consultation with the NDPP and Minster of Justice, appoint up to four Deputy National Directors of Public Prosecution 
(DNDPP).
36
 The President similarly appoints the Provincial Directors of Public Prosecutions (PDPP).
37
 The Minister, 
after consultation with the NDDP, appoints the deputy PDPP.
38
 In addition, the Minster may ‘in respect of the Office 
of the National Director appoint one or more Deputy Directors of Public Prosecutions to exercise certain powers, 
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It is evident, then, that the entire top echelon of the NPA (at least 14 positions) is appointed by the President and 
Minister of Justice without any input from other key stakeholders, such as Parliament, professional bodies or the 
public in general. This poses significant risks for the NPA’s independence. 
In DA v President of SA
40
 the Constitutional Court found that the appointment of Menzi Simelane as NDPP was 
irrational in that the President failed to take into consideration relevant information emanating from the Ginwala 
Enquiry, in which negative findings were made about Simelane.
41
 The Court found that the President must take all 
information into consideration, that the appointment process has to be rational, and that the President cannot 
cherry-pick the information on which he or she bases the decision to make an appointment.  
The parliamentary ad hoc committee that dealt with the suspension and dismissal of Advocate Pikoli as NDPP 
observes that ‘it may be an anomaly that Parliament plays no role in appointing the NDPP, but has the final say in his 
or her removal. The review of the legislation should also consider whether Parliament should play any role in the 
appointment of the NDPP.’
42
 
3.2.2 Dismissal of the NDPP 
Section 12(6)(a) of the NPA Act provides that the President can provisionally suspend the NDPP or a Deputy Director 
of Public Prosecutions (DDPP) pending an enquiry into his or her fitness told office. The President may remove him or 
her from office for (1) misconduct, (2) on account of ill health, (3) on account of incapacity to carry our his or her 
duties, and (4) on account that he or she is no longer a fit and proper person. The reason for the suspension as well as 
the representations thereto must be communicated to Parliament within 14 days of the suspension. Within 30 days 
(or as soon as possible after the communique), Parliament must pass a resolution to endorse or dismiss the decision 
of the President. The President must dismiss the NDPP or DDPP from office if an address of each of the Houses of 
Parliament in the same session praying for such dismissal is received on the grounds set out in section 12(6)(a) of the 
NPA Act. 
3.2.3 The ‘fit and proper person’ requirement 
Given the power held by prosecutors and the discretion with which they are entrusted, it follows that they need to 
possess certain qualities of character to prevent the misuse of such power and discretion. The European Commission 
for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), which provides guidance on this issue from an international 
perspective, states that because of the seriousness of a criminal conviction, the prosecutor ‘must act to a higher 
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standard than a litigant in a civil matter’.
43
 The Venice Commission also notes that the qualities required of a 
prosecutor are similar to those of a judge, and thus require a suitable procedure for appointment and promotion.
44
 
The requirement in South African law that the NDPP be a ‘fit and proper person’ is relevant in both the appointment 
and dismissal of the NDPP. The NPA Act requires that the NDPP must possess the necessary legal qualifications and 
must ‘be a fit and proper person, with due regard to his or her experience, conscientiousness and integrity, to be 
entrusted with the responsibilities of the office concerned’.
45
 Similarly, the President may remove an NDPP from 
office on the basis that he or she is no longer a fit and proper person.
46
 
The parliamentary ad hoc committee that dealt with the Pikoli case noted that the definition of ‘fit and proper’ 
contained in the NPA Act may need to be expanded to take account of other relevant criteria in ensuring that the 
NDPP discharges his or her responsibilities adequately and effectively.
47
 The Ginwala Commission also paid some 
attention to the notion of ‘fit and proper’: 
The element of fitness for the office of the NDPP that requires the person to be fit and proper to be “entrusted 
with the responsibilities of the office concerned” is not defined in the Act nor has it been judicially defined. I do 
not propose to define the concept except to say that, amongst others, the person must possess an 
understanding of the responsibilities of such an office. There must be an appreciation of the significance of the 
role a prosecuting authority plays in a constitutional democracy, the moral authority that the prosecuting 
authority must enjoy and the public confidence that must repose in the decisions of such an authority. To that 
must be added an appreciation for and sensitivity to matters of national security.
48
 
The issue of ‘sensitivity to matters of national security’ emanated from the facts of the Ginwala Commission itself and 
originated in the dispute that developed between President Mbeki and Adv. Pikoli regarding the timing of the arrest 
of former National Police Commissioner Jackie Selebi. It is doubtful if there is precedent for this requirement, and 
‘national security’ appears to have come in handy at the time as a cover-all term for getting rid of a too 
independently-minded NDPP. 
With the NPA Act being rather vague about the meaning and application of the requirement that an NDPP must be a 
‘fit and proper person’, the SCA placed the issue under scrutiny in 2011 when it considered the appointment of Menzi 
Simelane as NDPP.
49
 In Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa and others, the DA argued that 
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each of the qualities are stated in objective terms and that, furthermore, ‘the absence of the words “in the 
President’s opinion” is indicative that the fitness for office of a candidate is to be determined objectively. Put 
differently, these are jurisdictional requirements, so it was contended, that have to exist as an objective fact.’
50
 The 
Court went on to agree with the DA’s contention: 
[116] I disagree with the view that in applying s 9(1)(b) of the Act the President is entitled to bring his 
subjective view to bear. First, the section does not use the expression “in the President’s view” or some other 
similar expression. Second, it is couched in imperative terms. The appointee “must” be a fit and proper person. 
Third, I fail to see how qualities like “integrity” are not to be objectively assessed. An objective assessment of 
one’s personal and professional life ought to reveal whether one has integrity.
51
 
The term ‘integrity’ is therefore an objective requirement existing in law guiding the determination of ‘fit and proper’. 
The Court further drew upon the Oxford Dictionary to clarify ‘integrity’: ‘unimpaired or uncorrupted state; original 
perfect condition; soundness; innocence, sinlessness; soundness of moral principle; the character of uncorrupted 
virtue; uprightness; honesty, sincerity’. Further clarification was sought in the Collins Thesaurus: ‘honesty, principle, 
honour, virtue, goodness, morality, purity, righteousness, probity, rectitude, truthfulness, trustworthiness, 
incorruptibility, uprightness, scrupulousness, and reputability’. The following were noted as antonyms: ‘corruption, 
dishonesty, immorality, disrepute, deceit, duplicity’.
52
 
The SCA went on to state, ‘Consistent honesty is either present in one’s history or not, as are conscientiousness and 
experience.’ When the Constitutional Court heard the matter, it made a notable observation regarding the fact that 
information about Simelane’s dishonesty came from the Ginwala Commission, which is not a court of law:  
The last reason given is that the Ginwala Commission is not a court. This is an irrelevant consideration. It does 
not matter for the purposes of evaluation of credibility whether a person is dishonest and devious to a court, to 
a commission of enquiry, to an employer or to anyone else for that matter. Dishonesty is dishonesty wherever 
it occurs. And it is much worse when the person who had been dishonest is a senior government employee 
who gave evidence under oath. Although not a court, the Ginwala Commission was about as important a non-
judicial fact-finding forum as can be imagined.
53
  
The Court added that ‘conscientious’ is defined as ‘wishing to do what is right and relating to a person’s conscience’.
54
 
On this point the Court concluded that there is no doubt that the appointment of the NDPP is not to be left to the 
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subjective judgment of the President but needs to be ‘objectively assessed to meet the constitutional objective to 
preserve and protect the NPA and the NDPP as servants of the rule of law’.
55
  
When the matter of Simelane’s appointment reached the Constitutional Court, the latter agreed with the SCA’s 
reasoning as to what is ‘fit and proper’, and confirmed that the objective assessment against jurisdictional facts as 
exist in the NPA Act. The Court acknowledged that while the ‘fit and proper’ requirement does involve a value 
judgment, ‘it does not follow from this that the decision and evaluation lies within the sole and subjective preserve of 
the President’ and is therefore immune from objective scrutiny.
56
  
The tenure of NDPP Nxolisi Mxasana also ended in a cloud of suspicion after concerns were raised once more about 
his being a ‘fit and proper person’, this when it came to light that he had been charged with murder in the 1980s but 
later acquitted. Nevertheless, he did not disclose this prior to his appointment as NDPP, and as a result did not obtain 
the necessary security clearance.
57
 Two previous convictions of his for assault were indeed disclosed, but not so the 
complaints of professional misconduct laid against him by the KwaZulu-Natal Law Society.
58
 One cannot but speculate 
that Mxasana’s departure, facilitated by a R17-million pay-out,
59
 was linked to his insistence on suspending Advocates 
Jiba, Mrwebi and Mzinyathi of the NPA, a matter which is discussed below. 
The two DA decisions brought much clarity to the ‘fit and proper’ requirement after the Ginwala Commission 
demonstrated the uncertainty by accepting President Mbeki’s argument that the NDPP must be sensitive to national 
security concerns and the parliamentary ad hoc committee acknowledged that greater clarity is sought on this 
requirement. Identifying a ‘fit and proper’ NDPP is thus not a simple task and it would be appropriate that it not be 
done by one person behind closed doors. 
3.2.4 Other senior positions in the NPA  
The ‘fit and proper person’ requirement is relevant not only to the NDPP but other senior positions in the NPA. Two 
former DDPPs (Advocates Nomgcobo Jiba and Lawrence Mrwebi) were struck off the roll of advocates in mid-
September 2016. The General Council of the Bar brought the case, which related to their conduct in a number of 
matters. These included their decision to drop charges against the suspended police crime intelligence head Richard 
Mdluli; the ‘spy tapes’ matter relating to the dropping of corruption charges against President Jacob Zuma; and the 
case of suspended KwaZulu-Natal Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (the Hawks) head Johan Booysen in the 
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alleged Cato Manor ‘death squad’ matter.
60
 The judgment, in which they were disbarred, is scathing of Jiba and 
Mrwebi as well as their relationship with Richard Mdluli: 
[167] I cannot believe that two officers of the court (advocates) who hold such high positions in the prosecuting 
authority will stoop so low for the protection and defence of one individual who had been implicated in serious 
offences.  
[168] In fact, taking into account the kind of personality (referring to Mdluli), Mrwebi and Jiba had to deal with, 
they should have stood firm and vigorous on the ground by persisting to prosecute Mdluli on fraud and 
corruption charges. By their conduct, they did not only bring the prosecuting authority and the legal profession 
into disrepute, but have also brought the good office of the President of the Republic of South Africa into 
disrepute by failing to prosecute Mdluli who inappropriately suggested that he was capable of assisting the 




Despite the five judgments
62
 in which Jiba and Mrwebi were criticised for their conduct dating back to 2013 and 2014, 
they were not summarily booted out of the NPA, nor did they resign. Following the Freedom Under Law cases,
63
 the 
NDPP (at the time Mxolisi Nxasana) sought legal opinion on an appropriate course of action. The opinion was 
delivered on 7 July 2014 and recommended disciplinary action against Jiba and Mrwebi (as well as Mzinyathi, another 
senior prosecutor).  
On 18 July 2014, the NPA informed the Minister of Justice and Correctional Services in detail of the NPA’s motivation 
and arguments in support of a request that the President provisionally suspend Advocates Jiba, Mrwebi and 
Mzinyathi from their offices. The Minister was also asked to forward the memo to the President and request that he 
provisionally suspend the three senior NPA members pending an enquiry into their fitness to hold office as well as the 
finalisation of the envisaged criminal investigations and complaint lodged with the General Council of the Bar.
64
 A 
committee was established under Judge Zak Yacoob and delivered its report on 27 February 2015; the NDPP informed 
the Minister of the adverse findings made in respect of Advocates Jiba, Mrwebi and Mzinyathi.  
It should also be noted that the Minister of Justice had known about the unfavourable findings against the three NPA 
officials since at least July 2014 but did not inform the President. On 12 September 2014, a letter from the NDPP was 
hand-delivered to the President regarding these findings. Whatever the reasons may have been, it is evident that the 
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Minister was stalling a decision to suspend the NPA officials. The NDPP did not mince his words when he wrote in the 
2014/15 annual report: 
In spite of the above-mentioned urgent requests [to suspend the three officials] directed to the Minister and 
the President, and the outstanding criminal proceedings against Advocates Jiba, Mrwebi and Mzinyathi, no 
feedback has been received from the Minister or the President. As emphasised by the High Court, “the 
respondents are unbecoming of persons of such high rank in the public service, and especially worrying in the 
case of the (acting) NDPP, a senior officer of this court with weighty responsibilities in the proper 
administration of justice. The attitude of the respondents signals a troubling lack of appreciation of the 
constitutional ethos and principles underpinning the offices they hold.” Therefore, it is important for the 
Minister and the President to fulfil their constitutional mandate and to act as a matter of urgency.
65
 
On 16 September 2016, a year and seven months after the request for their suspension, Jiba and Mrwebi were placed 
on special leave.
66
 On 25 September 2016 President Zuma requested representations from both of them regarding his 
intention to suspend them pending an inquiry into their fitness to hold office.
67
 The motivation for not suspending the 
three officials is not clear, but there is little doubt that it was deliberate and that it raised further controversy and 
speculation about the already beleaguered NPA. 
A more rigorous, transparent and inclusive appointment process may have prevented the appointment of the officials 
discussed above. Leaving the selection and appointment of senior NPA staff to the President and his allies has 
evidently been costly in reputational damage to the NPA. 
3.2.4 Ministerial control over the prosecution service  
Both the Constitution and the NPA Act provide that the Minister of Justice shall ‘exercise final responsibility over the 
prosecuting authority in accordance with the provisions of this Act’, while at the same guaranteeing the 
independence of the NPA. However, the phrasing could imply a great deal of ministerial control of the prosecuting 
authority and hence a restriction of its independence. 
The SCA in NDPP v Zuma found there was no conflict in these provisions, quoting from Namibian jurisprudence with 
approval and clarifying that the provisions mean that, ‘although the Minister may not instruct the NPA to prosecute 
or to decline to prosecute or to terminate a pending prosecution, the Minister is entitled to be kept informed in 
respect of all prosecutions initiated or to be initiated which might arouse public interest or involve important aspects 
of legal or prosecutorial authority’.
68
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While the Ginwala Commission likewise found that the ambit of ministerial control did not include decisions around 
prosecution, it did find, in addition, that the Minister has a veto over prosecution policy,
69
 that the Minister tables the 
Annual Report of the NPA in Parliament
70
 and that the NDPP has the responsibility to inform the Minister in respect 
of any material case, matter or subject that is dealt with by the NPA in the exercise of its powers, duties or functions. 
71
  
The NPA Act seems to locate much of the Ministerial responsibility to the accounting function: the Director-General 
(DG) of Justice and Constitutional Development, the functionary of the Minister, is legislatively responsible for 
accounting for state monies paid out for the NPA. Yet the NPA assumed separate responsibility from 1 April 2001 for 
all support services previously rendered by the Department of Justice, and from this date it was responsible for its 
own accounting systems and the preparation of separate financial statements. The accounting authority is 
nevertheless still responsible for ensuring this is done properly. 
The ambit of the DG’s accounting function was the subject of some dispute between then NDPP Vusi Pikoli and then 
DG: Justice and Constitutional Development, Menzi Simelane, a dispute also forming part of the Ginwala Commission. 
Pikoli restricted the interpretation to ‘bean-counting’, whereas Simelane’s interpretation was in favour of wider 
control of the NPA by the Director-General.  
4 Accountability  
Corder, Jagwanth, and Soltau describe accountability in the general sense as follows:  
Accountability can be said to require a person to explain and justify – against criteria of some kind – their 
decisions or actions. It also requires that the person goes on to make amends for any fault or error and takes 
steps to prevent its recurrence in the future.
72
 
In relation to prosecutors, independence without accountability ‘poses an obvious danger to the public interest, 
which requires the fair and just administration of the criminal justice system’.
73
 While prosecutorial independence is 
an essential element in the proper administration of justice, it must be recognised that inherent in independence 
without accountability is the potential for making ‘arbitrary, capricious, and unjust decisions’.
74
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The NPA sits between the executive and the judiciary, but is more associated with the executive than the judiciary.
75
 
The NDPP is explicitly accountable to the Minister of Justice
76
 and ultimately Parliament, while the reviewability in the 
courts of its decisions to prosecute or not has been the subject of some controversy.  
4.1 Accountability to the Judiciary  
The duty of a prosecutor is not to secure a conviction but to assist the court in arriving at a just verdict. In S v Jija the 
court noted: ‘A prosecutor … stands in a special relation to the Court. His paramount duty is not to procure a 
conviction but to assist the Court in ascertaining the truth.’
77
 The power of the prosecution is thus tempered primarily 
by its relationship with the courts. 
4.1.1 Accountability for general conduct of proceedings  
The prosecution is accountable to the courts for delays in prosecution and for the general conduct of the case during 
proceedings. A court can strike a case from the roll if the prosecution is tardy, and may find the prosecution in 
contempt of court if it fails to follow judicial directions. Thus, accountability to the judiciary relates largely to the 
accountability of individual prosecutors in relation to particular cases, rather than to the accountability of the 
organisation as a whole. However, the NPA’s prosecution policy and directives are subject to judicial review, and the 
Pretoria High Court struck down as unlawful and invalid the NPA’s 2005 amendments to its policy and directives 
regarding prosecutions arising from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), because the policy and directives 
had the effect of granting ‘amnesty’ to those denied it by the TRC (see below).  
4.1.2 Accountability for decisions to prosecute 
Historically, courts interfere with decisions to prosecute only in limited circumstances, for example, where the 
discretion to prosecute is improperly exercised (illegal and irrational)
78
 or there exist mala fides.
79
 This is because 
ultimately it is the courts which decide on guilt and the prosecution must prove a criminal case ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’. Thus a case brought by the prosecution which is not supported by the facts or by the law will ultimately fail 
once it is tested in court. Nevertheless, a great deal of reputational damage can be wrought against an accused simply 
by the bringing of a case, and the prosecution can be abused in this manner to political ends. An aggrieved accused 
may bring a case of malicious prosecution and pursue civil damages.  
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4.1.3 Accountability for decisions not to prosecute  
There is a duty on the prosecution to prosecute where a prima facie case has been demonstrated, save for 
exceptional circumstance. Decisions not to prosecute where no prima facie case has been demonstrated are 
relatively uncontroversial. Decisions not to prosecute where a prima face case has been demonstrated are 
controversial as they hinge on the exercise of discretion by the prosecution. The NPA has strongly resisted any judicial 
review of its prosecutorial decisions, whether to prosecute or not to prosecute. The SCA in Democratic Alliance v The 
Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions held that the decision by the office of the NDPP to discontinue 
prosecution is subject to constitutional review and that in the case at hand a political party (i.e. the DA) has locus 
standi to bring an application to review a decision.
80
 
4.1.4 Accountability for Prosecution Policy and Directives  
The NPA Prosecution Policy is subject to judicial review. The TRC gave the NPA a list of 300 names of people who had 
been denied amnesty or who did not apply for amnesty. In December 2008 Judge Legodi of the North Gauteng High 
Court overturned a 2005 amendment to NPA Prosecution Policy that purported to permit negotiating ‘amnesty’ with 
such persons. The court application was brought by the widows of the ‘Cradock Four’
81
 and the sister of Nokuthula 
Simelane, supported by three civil society organisations. It took until February 2016 for the NPA to bring a 
prosecution in relation to Simelane after her family launched further applications. At the time of writing the case had 
not yet been resolved.  
The existing Prosecution Policy does have an overall tenor of discouraging prosecution. The Prosecution Directives, 
which are determined by the NDPP alone and contain detailed guidelines to prosecutors, are treated as ‘confidential’ 
by the NPA. Current Prosecution Policy provides that the consent of the NDPP is sought whenever specified public 
officials are to be prosecuted and that this requirement is necessary to avoid prosecutions in ‘inappropriate 
circumstances’.
82
 The UN Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors are alive to this problem inasmuch it pertains 
specifically to public officials suspected of corruption, abuse of power and serious human rights violations, with the 
Guidelines requiring that special attention should be given to such cases.
83
 The Venice Commission acknowledges 
that not bringing prosecution which ought to be brought is probably a more common problem than incorrectly 
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brought prosecutions and, furthermore, that it is more difficult to counter due to lack of judicial control.
84
 The SCA 
has held that equal weight and scrutiny must be accorded to the decision not to prosecute in apparent ‘inappropriate 
circumstances’ as to the decision to prosecute.
85
 
4.2 Accountability to Parliament  
The Constitution requires that the executive must account to Parliament for its actions, policies, expenditure and so 
forth, and states that this also applies to the NPA.
86
 The NPA Act provides that the NPA shall be accountable to 
Parliament ‘in respect of its powers, functions and duties under this Act, including decisions regarding the institution 
of prosecutions’.
87
 Despite these provisions, the legislation is vague on how Parliament should exercise its mandate. 
Oversight has a broader meaning than accountability, and includes a wide range of activities and initiatives aimed at 
monitoring the executive.
88
 Yet while accountability and oversight may differ in scope and focus, it is also clear that 
they are closely linked and mutually reinforcing. 
A key means of holding the executive to account to Parliament is through the latter’s various oversight committees, 
which in the case of the NPA is the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Correctional Services (formerly the Portfolio 
Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development). According to the website of the Parliamentary Monitoring 
Group, between 2012-2016 the Portfolio Committee called on the NPA to report to it on nine occasions, as indicated 
in the table below which also notes the topics of the meetings. 
 
Table 1: Portfolio Committee oversight meetings with the NPA (2012-2016) 
Date Topic 
16 April 2012 Strategic plan 
15 October 2012 Performance plan 
22 April 2013 Strategic and annual performance plan 
7 October 2013 Annual report 
3 July 2014 Strategic plan 
24 April 2015 Strategic plan 
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15 October 2015 Annual report 
12 October 2016 Annual report 
4 November 2016 Withdrawal of charges against Minister Gordhan 
Nine engagements over a five-year period is insufficient to deal with matters in-depth and engage in penetrating and 
robust debate. However, it is also the case that the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Correctional Services has one 
of the largest portfolios in Parliament,
89
 with matters having been made worse when Correctional Services was added 
to the portfolio after the 2014 general elections.  
The Venice Commission recommends that while the prosecuting authority should be accountable to Parliament, the 
scope of such accountability should be limited, in the sense that it should exclude decisions in individual cases and 
instead address issues such as the prosecution policy.
90
 The NPA Act does require, however, that the NPA must also 




It was with reference to ‘decisions regarding the institution of prosecutions’ that the NDPP (Shaun Abrahams) was 
summoned to appear before the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Correctional Services in late 2016 to explain why 
the Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan, and two others were charged with fraud, only for these charges to be 
withdrawn a few days later.
92
 The controversy over the laying of charges against Minister Gordhan simply deepened 
suspicions about the motives and independence of the NPA; however, having Parliament summon Abrahams to 
appear before it to explain his decision sets a dangerous precedent.  
At the Committee meeting Abrahams was at pains to explain that the decision to prosecute Gordhan et al. was not 
made by him but the Director of the Priority Crimes Litigation Unit (PCLU) in the NPA (Adv. Pretorius) and the North 
Gauteng Director of Public Prosecutions (Adv. Mzinyathi). He supported the decision, and this is what he announced 
at a media briefing. He was quick, nonetheless, to point out to the Portfolio Committee that the fact that he 
announced the decision to prosecute did not mean he owned the decision.
93
 Following the media briefing in question, 
Abrahams invited and received submissions from two of the accused and two civil society organisations.
94
  
With new information available, as per the representations, Abrahams decided to review the decision to prosecute 
and withdrew the charges against Gordhan et al. When he appeared before Parliament, he was not accompanied by 
                                                          
89
 See Appendix 1. 
90
 Report on European standards as regards the independence of the judicial system: Part II – The Prosecution Service, Adopted by 
the Venice Commission at its 85
th
 plenary session (Venice, 17-18 December 2010) CDL-Ad(2010) 040, paras. 42-43. 
91
 S 35(1) NPA Act. 
92
 PMG Report on the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Correctional Services of 4 November 2016, 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/23596/.  
93
 PMG Audio recording of the meeting of the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Correctional Services of 4 November 2016, Time 
lapse at 1:17:00, https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/23596/. 
94
 Freedom under Law and the Helen Suzman Foundation. 
26 
 
Pretorius and Mzinyathi – the officials who purportedly ‘own’ the decision. Despite protests from MPs about the 
absence of these officials, Abrahams was able to navigate direct questioning without disclosing the facts, or admitting 
the absence thereof, that resulted in the initial charging of Gordhan et al. and the subsequent withdrawal of charges. 
When asked by an opposition MP whether he would submit to Parliament documents indicating Advocate 
Mzinyathi’s support for the prosecutions, he replied that he would consider it via a ‘written request’.
95
  
This response, and the general content of the ‘briefing’, as Abrahams referred to it, indicated that Parliament was not 
being taken seriously as it holds little real power over the NDPP. In effect, his position was that he would decide what 
information Parliament receives or not from the NPA; by implication, it meant that Parliament could not compel him 
to submit it. The NDPP was mistaken, however, because the Rules of the National Assembly are clear about the 
powers of the committees to compel any person to produce such documents as it requests.
96
 Nonetheless, if MPs 
(especially opposition ones) laboured under the expectation that they would lay eyes on the ‘facts’ that informed the 
two decisions, they were mistaken. 
The NDPP’s claim is that it was not he who made the decision to prosecute the Minister of Finance and hence he 
could not be held accountable for it. However, the claim holds no water, since the NDPP bears ultimate responsibility 
for decisions to prosecute or not.  
The question in relation to the NDPP and NPA’s accountability to Parliament is whether such accountability for 
individual cases (as described above in relation to the Gordhan case) could on another occasion lead to inappropriate 
influencing of the actions of the NDPP by Parliament. Thus it is recommended that, as per the Venice Commission, 
Parliament’s role be limited to reviewing performance and influencing policy and policy directives. 
4.3 Accountability to the Minister  
As discussed above, accountability to the executive in the form of the Minister holds within it the threat to 
independence, but only if it extends to interference in the decision to prosecute or not to prosecute. In law, the 
accountability to the Minister does not extend to influencing these decisions, although the Minister is entitled to be 
informed of them, particularly with regard to high-profile cases. Thus, the accountability to the Minister is general 
rather than specific to particular cases, and relates to the formulation of policy, reporting to Parliament, and financial 
probity.  
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5 Effectiveness  
What does it mean for the prosecution to be effective? Teasing out standards for the effectiveness of the prosecution 
is not a trivial exercise. It is suggested that, in the South African context, an effective prosecution is one that achieves 
the following:  
• Offenders are held accountable for their crimes; in other words, prosecutions occur when appropriate. 
• Crime is reduced through the conviction of serious, serial and prolific offenders who are responsible for a 
disproportionate number of crimes. 
• Cases are disposed of appropriately according to the offender and the offence.  
• Cases are disposed of in a timely, efficient and cost-effective manner.97 
This section, working on the basis of available data, assesses the extent to which these standards are adhered to in 
practice.  
5.1 Are offenders being held accountable? 
The primary mechanism through which offenders are held accountable is prosecution in court. As discussed above, in 
its prosecution policy the NPA provides that it should prosecute when there is evidence on the face of it and if the 
prospects of success are reasonable. Conviction rates provide an easy measure of what the prospects of success 
actually have been for the prosecution. 
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Figure 1: Conviction rates, 2002/3 to 2015/16 
 
 
The evidence suggests that the NPA is setting the bar very high on ‘reasonable prospects of success’. Of cases the NPA 
decides to prosecute, the rate of conviction has increased slowly but steadily from 82% in 2002/2003 to 93% in 
2015/16 – an overall increase of 11 percentage points and an increase of almost a percentage point each year.  
South Africa has now reached a rate of conviction which is inching closer to the 99% conviction rate enjoyed in China 
and other states with repressive justice systems.
98
 This means the NPA has only a 7% chance of failure in the cases it 
decides to prosecute, which is far more than a ‘reasonable’ prospect of success. This change might not have affected 
the extent to which offenders are held accountable in court if the number of people being prosecuted had remained 
the same or increased, or if the proportion of arrests resulting in prosecution had remained the same or increased.  
Unfortunately, the reality is that far fewer people are being prosecuted, in absolute numbers and when expressed as 
a percentage of arrests. 
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Figure 2: NPA prosecutions and convictions, 2002/3 to 2015/16 
 
The number of cases actually prosecuted has dropped from 407,530 cases finalised in the courts in 2002/3 to 319,149 
in 2015/16 – a decrease of almost two percentage points per year, or an overall decrease of 22% in the number of 
cases prosecuted.
99
 The decrease is not a result of a drop in referrals by the South African Police Service (SAPS); 
indeed, the number of arrests has steadily increased over time. The number of priority crime arrests exceeded 1,023 
million in 2015/16, compared to just under 445,000 in 2002/3.
100
 Furthermore, from 2010/11 the SAPS’ Detective 
Service began reporting on the number of ‘detections’ for the 20 most serious crimes it records, as well as on the 
number of ‘trial-ready’ dockets prepared in this regard. It is apparent that during these six years the figures have gone 
up rather than down (see Figure 3), which suggests that these trends too cannot explain the drop in prosecutions.  
The conclusion to be drawn from this data is that offenders are not being held accountable in the courts to the same 
degree as they were more than a decade ago. (The question of alternative resolutions is dealt with below.) 
5.2 Are serious, serial and prolific offenders being convicted?  
Unlike the NPA, the SAPS reports (since 2008/9) on convictions for each crime category and sums the 20 most serious 
crimes to provide totals on convictions. Comparing the SAPS serious crime total and the NPA total convictions usually 
results in the SAPS recording slightly more total convictions for the 20 most serious crimes than the total reported by 
the NPA, given that the NPA counts cases whereas, allowing that a case may involve more than one charge, the SAPS 
counts charges convicted.  
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However, since 2013/14 NPA convictions have exceeded SAPS convictions, while the latter have decreased by more 
than 100,000 since 2008/9. This suggests two things:  
• An increasing proportion of NPA convictions do not relate to the 20 most serious crimes reported on by the 
SAPS, which suggests in turn that such crimes are assuming less prominence among prosecutions  
• The NPA convictions do not comprise as many charges as previously, suggesting that those being convicted 
are increasingly being convicted on only one charge. This could indicate that serial and prolific offenders are 
less prominent among NPA convictions.  
Figure 3: Number of SAPS and NPA convictions per year, 2008/9 to 2015/16 
 
These suggestions are given further weight by a trend in SAPS data showing that an increasing number of convictions 
relate to ‘crimes dependants on police action’, with an almost flat trend in the case of other serious crimes (see 
Figure 4). ‘Police action’ crimes (drugs, firearms, driving under the influence, and so on) are generally ‘victimless’ in 
nature and easier to prosecute, as they do not require the cooperation of a complainant. The number of these 
convictions has increased, albeit slightly, whereas the number of convictions relating to other serious crimes has 
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Figure 4: Number of convictions per year for police action crimes, compared to other serious crimes  
 
Indeed, comparing 2008/9 to 2015/16, by crime category, and expressed as a percentage of reported crime, all 
categories have recorded a reduced percentage of convictions in relation to reported crime (see in Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Convictions expressed as a percentage of reported crime, 2008/9 and 2015/16 
 
Consider together, these data trends suggest it is increasingly unlikely that serious and serial prolific offenders are 
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5.3 Are cases disposed of appropriately by offence and offender?  
The data above provide some indication of the extent to which crimes, particularly serious ones, are disposed of in 
court. However, convictions are not the only method of disposing of cases. Both the CEO of the NPA and the former 
NDPP have argued that part of the reason for the drop in the number of cases finalised in court lies in the increase in 
resolutions outside court in the form of ‘alternative dispute resolution mechanisms’ (ADRM).
101
  
ADRM increased exponentially, from 14,808 per year in 2002/3 to 184,314 per year in 2014/2015, but declined to 
166,952 in 2015/16.
102
 Theoretically, ADRM should occur only where there is in fact a prima facie case – if no such 
case exists, there should be no mediation, but instead a simple nolle prosequi. Yet the SAPS seem to indicate that 
mediation sometimes occurs in the absence of a finalised case, as their definition of what counts as a ‘trial-ready 
docket’ includes cases mediated but not fully investigated.  
There are many reasons to prefer ADRM to prosecution and imprisonment, not the least being overcrowded prisons. 
But not all ADRMs are created equal. The bulk of ADRM as it is currently occurring (as much as 75%) takes the form 
‘informal mediation’. 
103
 What is ‘informal mediation’? The NPA Policy Directives provide that ‘[i]nformal mediation is 
a process of resolving disputes between parties with the assistance of a mediator. The mediator facilitates the 




The Directives further provide that the mediator may be the prosecutor; that informal mediation should ‘mainly’ be 
considered for ‘less serious’ offences; that it should not be considered for murder, rape, robbery aggravating, 
domestic violence, offences involving children as victims, racially motivated offences, offences likely to garner a 
prison sentence, and offences involving repeat offenders; that written authorisation must be obtained from an 
authorised representative of the DPP; and that the prosecutor may not be rewarded for the mediation.  
‘Informal mediation’ appears to be the ultimate in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, with the prosecution 
simply agreeing not to prosecute a case to the benefit of the accused. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that this 
sometimes occurs with agreement by the alleged accused to pay compensation to the alleged victim. This kind of 
scenario may hold considerable potential for abuse. With more than 160,000 such cases per year – slightly more than 
half of prosecutions – this is a particularly worrying situation as it implies that a very substantial proportion of 
prosecutorial decision-making is exercised with little if any oversight in largely unregulated environment.  
In his budget vote speech in April 2016, the Minister of Justice, Michael Masutha, said in relation to the continued 
growth in ADRM that ‘[w]e are currently working with the NPA to refine the system to ensure that it is fair and just, 
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not only to the accused but equally to the victim as well’.
105
 This suggests that in its current ‘unrefined’ form it may 
not be fair and just. Indeed, no information exists to indicate whether it is or not, which raises concerns about the 
due process rights of the accused and undue pressure on victims.  
Figure 6: Formal and informal dispute resolution, 2007/8 and 2014/15 (NPA data) 
 
The data from the SAPS discussed in the previous section shows large decreases for serious crimes involving 
complainants (i.e. for crimes which are not police-action crimes). If this is accounted for by informal mediation, it is 
cause for concern. Indeed, if mediation does account for the drop, the massive growth in ADRM disappears if 
‘informal mediations’ are removed from the ADRM total. For the period 2014/2015, only 47,008 ‘formally’ mediated 
cases remain – which is a similar figure to the 46,470 diversions recorded in 2007/8, when ‘informal’ mediations 
began to be counted. By contrast, formal ADRM, such as diversion in terms of the Child Justice Act, involves the 
courts and other institutional role-players like Legal Aid, with the agreements reached being confirmed by the courts. 
The procedure requires acknowledgement of responsibility and actions of atonement or reform from the child being 
diverted. The withdrawal of the case is contingent on these actions being carried out. 
In relation to informal mediation, no central register is maintained, and each prosecutor is directed only to maintain 
‘a file’ of informal mediations. What is unclear, then, is the extent to which any prosecutor can be sure a particular 
accused has not been previously ‘informally mediated’. Thus, to answer the question whether cases are being 
disposed of appropriately by offence and offender, a great deal more information would need to be made available. 
On the face of it, such information as is available raises concern that prosecutions are increasingly of less serious 
offences and are being replaced by informal mediations. It is certainly not clear that cases are being disposed of 
appropriately. Better information from the NPA may clarify matters.  
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5.4 Are cases disposed of in a timely, efficient and cost-effective manner?  
In its statistical reporting, the NPA adds formal and informal mediation to cases prosecuted (convicted and acquitted) 
to come to a total number of cases dealt with by the NPA argue that its productivity has increased. Indeed, a trend 
toward an increase in this total number is observed after 2007/8, the period when informal mediations began to take 
off. Does this mean the NPA is dealing with cases in a more timely, efficient and cost-effective manner?  
Figure 7: Number of cases resolved in court plus alternative dispute resolutions (including informal mediations)  
 
5.4.1 Cost-effectiveness  
For the sake of argument, assume that all ‘informal mediations’ are indeed appropriate resolutions of cases. Does this 
20% increase in ‘resolutions’ then match the increase in funding since 2002/3? The marginal increase in total 
‘appropriate resolutions’ does not keep pace with the increase in funding in real terms – which is of the order of a 
doubling over the last decade.  
In 2002/3, the general prosecutions arm of the NPA received just over R621 million and the NPA as a whole, almost 
R924 million. Taking only inflation into account, these amounts would be equivalent in June 2016 to R1.4 billion to 
the general prosecutions arm and a little more than R2 billion to the NPA as a whole. Instead, by 2014/2015 the 
budget allocation was R2.7 billion – almost double the inflation-adjusted 2002/3 amount. For the NPA as a whole it 
was almost R3.7 billion, about 185% of what it was in 2002/3.  
Massive increases in funding should predict a massive increase in productivity. But the number of cases (even if one 
includes informal mediation) per millions of rand spent has fallen. In 2002/3, each ‘constructively resolved’ case – if 
calculated on the budget for general prosecutions only and prosecutions plus ADRM – cost R3,254 in todays’ money. 
By 2014/15 the amount was R5,385 per case, an increase of 65% in cost in real terms. If ADRM is excluded from the 
analysis, each prosecution (convicted and acquitted) cost R3,372 per case in 2002/3 and R8,495 in 2014/15 – an 










5.4.2 Efficiency  
Have prosecutors become more efficient and productive? In 2005/6, there were 1,982 prosecutors
106
 and 373,995 
actual prosecutions. This meant each prosecutor dealt with 189 prosecutions per year, or almost four per week. In 
2011/12, the NPA had 2,745 prosecutors;
107
 there were 319,149 actual prosecutions. This means each prosecutor 
dealt with only 116 prosecutions per year – just more than two per week. Even if ADRM is included, then in 2005/6 
there were 207 per prosecutor, whereas in 2011/12 there were only 163 per prosecutor. Thus, the NPA has not 
become more efficient, measured by cases per prosecutor, including finalisations by ADRM.  
5.4.3 Timeliness  
Average court hours have dropped, along with the number of cases finalised in court. But have cases speeded up or 
slowed down? The data show average court hours decreased from 4h09 minutes per court day in 2002/3 to 3h16 
minutes in 2015/16 – a total drop of 53 minutes and a 21% reduction in court minutes per day.
108
 Assuming that total 
court days stayed the same, if cases in 2015/16 were finalised at the same average speed as in 2002/3, an average 
court day of 3h16 should have resulted in 320,787 cases being finalised in 2015/16 – which is about 10,000 more than 
actually were.  
Put differently, if speed had remained the same, the 310,840 cases actually finalised should have resulted in average 
court hours of only 3h09 minutes, not the 3h16 minutes recorded in actuality. If the number of courts, and therefore 
the total number of court days, have increased (which is highly likely), then the calculations would be even more 
unfavourable.  
Prosecutors are doing less prosecuting in court and taking more time about it. Indeed, this can be measured by the 
increase in the duration of time accused persons spent awaiting trial.  
5.5 Summary of issues on performance 
Fewer offenders than previously are being held accountable in relation to reported crime. The data suggest that 
fewer serious and prolific offenders are being convicted than previously. There are insufficient data to determine 
whether cases are being disposed of appropriately according to offender and offence; the available data suggest 
there is cause for concern. Cases cost more, fewer cases are resolved per prosecutor, and cases are taking longer than 
before. In conclusion, the available data strongly suggest that the overall performance of the NPA has declined.  
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6 Recommendations  
6.1 Independence  
6.1.1 Preventing politically controlled decisions  
Amend the NPA Act to require judicial review of controversial decisions.  
The NPA Act is clear on what the Minister can expect from the NDPP with reference to information requests.
109
 The 
Constitutional Court found that the Minister had violated section 32(1)(b) of the NPA Act when then Minister 
Mabandla instructed then NDPP Pikoli to hold off with the arrest of the Commissioner of Police until she had given 
approval.
110
 Inasmuch as the NDPP is protected in law from interference, the reality is different and political heads 
appear to have seen little wrong in attempting to influence how the office of the NDPP performs its functions, as 
evidenced by the Shaun Abraham decisions in relation to the Minister of Finance and other SARS officials.  
The solution possibly lies not in the NPA Act but in amending the Criminal Procedure Act to require that, on request, 
the NPA demonstrate before the courts, perhaps in camera, the evidence at hand influencing its decisions whenever 
prosecutions, or failures to prosecute, appear to be politically motivated.  
6.1.2 Removing the centrality of the NDPP in decision-making  
It can be argued that the drafters of the Constitution erred in locating so much power in the position of the NDPP 
and, furthermore, in subjecting the NDPP to some degree of control by the Minister. Ultimately, the Constitution 
should be amended to remove ministerial control and to diffuse the power of the NDPP on a geographic basis. This 
would reduce the political pressure on a single individual.  
6.1.3 Amending the appointment process of the NDPP  
Assuming that the Constitution cannot easily be amended and continues to locate final power in the NDPP, the 
question therefore arises as to how the appointment process can be made more inclusive, transparent and, frankly, 
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more rigorous to ensure an independent and accountable NDPP. The Venice Commission places significant emphasis 
on the process whereby a Prosecutor General, or in this case the NDPP, is appointed: 
It is important that the method of selection of the general prosecutor should be such as to gain the 
confidence of the public and the respect of the judiciary and the legal profession. Therefore professional, 
non-political expertise should be involved in the selection process. However, it is reasonable for a 
Government to wish to have some control over the appointment, because of the importance of the 
prosecution of crime in the orderly and efficient functioning of the state, and to be unwilling to give some 
other body, however distinguished, carte blanche in the selection process. It is suggested, therefore, that 
consideration might be given to the creation of a commission of appointment comprised of persons who 
would be respected by the public and trusted by the Government.
111
 
If it is accepted that the appointment will ultimately still be made by the President, as head of the executive, then 
there are two immediate possibilities. First, Parliament plays a more direct role in identifying the suitable candidate 
for the President to appoint. Secondly, the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) identifies the suitable candidate and the 
President appoints on its recommendation.
112
 Both structures already perform similar functions in this regard, for 
example, in the appointment of judges, in the case of the JSC, and the appointment of the Public Protector and other 
heads of Chapter 9 institutions, in the case of Parliament.
113
 
The Constitution, in section 193, sets out the procedure for identifying suitable appointees for the position of Public 
Protector and other heads of Chapter 9 institutions. Given that the NDPP is an individual appointed to that position, it 
is argued that an improved appointment process of the NDPP should be more akin to the process with regard to the 
positions of the Public Protector and Auditor General of South Africa (AGSA) than to the five Commissions established 
by Chapter 9 of the Constitution.  
In contemplating reform of the current process for appointing the NDPP, a number of guidelines can be extrapolated 
from the appointment process of the Public Protector and the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA). First, 
candidates should reflect the race and gender composition of the population.
114
 Second, in addition to a candidate’s 
being a fit and proper person, it is a requirement that he or she have specialist knowledge, as is the case with the 
AGSA: ‘Specialised knowledge of, or experience in, auditing, state finances and public administration must be given 
due regard in appointing the Auditor-General.’
115
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A certain minimum number of years of experience in a particular field may also be set as a requirement, as is the case 
with the Public Protector, who must be any of the following: 
• a judge; 
• an admitted and practising advocate or attorney with ten years’ experience;  
• a qualified and admitted advocate or attorney and have lectured law at a university with ten years’ 
experience; 
• a person with specialist knowledge of – or for a period of at least ten years, experience in, the administration 
of justice, public administration or public finance; 
• a member of Parliament for at least ten years; or 




It should be noted that the requirements for the Deputy Public Protector are the same, save that this position cannot 
be occupied by a judge. It is evident that the drafters of the Constitution wanted to weed out wholly unsuitable 
applicants for the position of Public Protector and his or her Deputy by requiring at least ten years’ experience in law, 
the administration of justice, public administration and/or public finance.  
On the other hand, the requirements for the NDPP are rather slim when compared to those of the Public Protector 
and AGSA; here, it is required merely that the person be fit and proper and ‘possess legal qualifications that would 
entitle him or her to practice in all courts in the Republic’.
117
 In terms of the Legal Practice Act, any person who has 
been admitted and enrolled to practise as a legal practitioner in terms of the Act is entitled to practise throughout 
South Africa, unless his or her name has been ordered to be struck off the Roll, or is subject to an order suspending 
him or her from practising.
118
 There is no requirement of specialist knowledge or numbers of years of experience. 
Whilst it may not be possible or even desirable to set specific criteria in respect of qualifications, the structure 
identifying the suitable candidate would benefit from the advice of experts from the legal community and civil 
society.
119
 The current relatively low threshold is particularly worrisome given the powerful position of the NDPP.  
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Furthermore, the composition of the Parliamentary Committee (or, regarding the appointment of judges, the JSC) 
making the selection is important, as the aim is to bring a broad range of skills, knowledge and stakeholders into the 
selection process. Identifying a suitable person as Public Protector or AGSA requires that the National Assembly must 
recommend persons nominated by a committee of the National Assembly proportionally composed of members of all 
parties represented in the Assembly. Moreover, the nomination must be approved by the Assembly by a resolution 
adopted with a supporting vote of at least 60 per cent of the members if the recommendation concerns the 
appointment of the Public Protector or the AGSA.
120
 
The JSC, for the purpose of appointing judges, consists of the following 23, and in some cases 25, persons: 
• the Chief Justice, who presides at meetings of the Commission; 
• the President of the Supreme Court of Appeal;  
• one Judge President designated by the Judges President;  
• the Cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice, or an alternate designated by that Cabinet 
member;  
• two practising advocates nominated from within the advocates' profession to represent the profession as a 
whole, and appointed by the President;  
• two practising attorneys nominated from within the attorneys' profession to represent the profession as a 
whole, and appointed by the President;  
• one teacher of law designated by teachers of law at South African universities;  
• six persons designated by the National Assembly from among its members, at least three of whom must be 
members of opposition parties represented in the Assembly;  
• four permanent delegates to the National Council of Provinces designated together by the Council with a 
supporting vote of at least six provinces;  
• four persons designated by the President as head of the national executive, after consulting the leaders of all 
the parties in the National Assembly; and  
• when considering matters relating to a specific High Court, the Judge President of that Court and the Premier 
of the province concerned, or an alternate designated by each of them.
121
 
The appointment of certain persons to the JSC is also not at the exclusive discretion of the President, a factor that 
provides a further safety measure. Certain members are there ex officio (for example, the Judge President), and 
persons nominated by the legal profession, as well as persons from the National Assembly and National Council of 
Provinces nominated by those structures. The diversity of membership of the JSC ensures that candidates are 
thoroughly questioned as well as that different perspectives are aired during interviews; the latter are open to the 
public, as it has a vested interest in which persons are appointed to Chapter 9 institutions and as judges.  
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Much can be learnt from the appointment of the Public Protector and the AGSA and used to improve the 
appointment of the NDPP, particularly the emphases on experience, expertise and the nature of the process by which 
the candidate is identified. The central points are that these appointments are not the President’s sole prerogative 
and that the process followed is an open one. 
6.2 Accountability  
6.2.1 Judicial review of prosecution directives  
Prosecution policy and directives should be reviewed to ensure that all persons are equally subject to prosecution. 
Requirements for authorisation to prosecute should be counterbalanced by authorisations to withdraw or not charge, 
whenever there is a prima facie case.  
The Constitution provides that the NDPP sets prosecution policy and directives. The NPA Act says this must be set 
after consultation with the Minister. The Prosecution Policy Directives of 1 June 2014, which the NPA treats as 
confidential, contain a number of provisions that have the effect of discouraging prosecution.  
In particular, the chapter entitled ‘Prosecution of certain categories of persons’ is highly problematic. It requires that 
written authorisation or instruction be obtained from the NDPP or DPP whenever prosecution is to be instituted in 
respect of certain serious offences by senior members of the SAPS, SANDF, DCS, and municipal law enforcement as 
well as by diplomats and Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJCD) officials, prosecutors, 
magistrates and judges. It is clear that this serves to discourage the prosecution of these individuals.  
Furthermore, the chapter requires notice to be given only to the head of the employer organisation concerned (for 
example, the DOJCD) of the decision against prosecuting such individuals, when the offence involves an element of 
violence or dishonesty. The decision not to prosecute such individuals should surely be reviewed at a more senior 
level within the prosecution authority itself, given the importance of ensuring the integrity of officials in the criminal 
justice system.  
More broadly speaking, read as a whole the Directives discourage, rather than encourage, prosecution. Only in cases 
of domestic violence (violation of a protection order), sexual offences, and trafficking in persons is there a specific 
directive not to withdraw without authorisation. 
 In relation to diversion, authorised prosecutors may divert cases of murder, aggravated robbery and rape, although 
the Directives provide that there should be no diversion for an accused with a criminal record or a previous diversion. 
On a practical level, while the diversion must be recorded in a diversion register, there appears to be no searchable 
central diversion register which would ensure that previously diverted individuals, who may have been diverted 
previously in another geographical location, are not diverted again.  
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6.2.3 Consultation on informal mediation provisions  
Informal mediation is possibly of even more concern, as no searchable central record appears to be kept of previous 
informal mediations, and there is no requirement for such a register, only a requirement for an ‘informal mediations 
file’. While the policy directives indicate that murder, rape and aggravated robbery may not be subject to informal 
mediation, it is possible, according to these directives, for prosecutors to obtain authorisation for informal mediation 
in such cases.  
Policy directives determine the trends in relation to prosecution and should be more widely consulted upon. The 
legislation should be amended to ensure input by a broader range of stakeholders into prosecution policy and 
directives. The directives should be amended to take closer account of the role prosecution plays in crime prevention 
by removing serious prolific offenders from society. In particular, guidelines on informal mediation should be finalised 
as a matter of urgency.  
6.2.4 Accountability to Parliament on expenditure on record-keeping systems  
Despite billions of rand and years of investment since 1998, the ‘Integrated Justice System’ in the form of integrated 
records amongst the criminal justice agencies still does not exist, making it difficult for the courts and prosecution to 
arrive at a real assessment of the risk posed by a particular person arrested or accused. Widespread withdrawals 
compound the problem. Prosecution directives should take into account the practicalities of record-keeping systems 
to ensure that repeat offenders and offenders who pose a risk are prosecuted. 
It is mystifying that something which could probably be achieved by a relatively simple database still has not been 
developed, despite the massive budgets spent on this. The focuses of these budgets for ‘Integrated Justice’ seem to 
be on measuring performance rather than accurately identifying who poses a risk. The system should be able to 
record and track all interactions with the criminal justice system of any person, and link any person to any existing 
case in which she or he is already linked. Parliament needs to interrogate why this is not yet in place, and hold those 
to account who have failed to deliver.  
6.3 Performance  
6.3.1 Accountability on performance to Parliament 
Parliament should require detailed reporting, particularly in relation to offences involving violence, and on the extent 
to which prosecution has successfully targeted repeat offenders or offenders posing a risk to society. 
The NPA, unlike the SAPS, fails to report in detail to Parliament in their Annual Report, thus obscuring the fact that 
almost half of its prosecutions are now in relation to so-called ‘victimless offences’ in particular drug offences. SAPS 
data suggest that the number of convictions for other serious crimes has almost halved since 2009. 
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By comparison, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) in England and Wales provides, inter alia, the following reports: 
• A monthly analysis of the outcome of CPS proceedings in magistrates' courts and in the Crown Court by 
principal offence category. 
• Joint enterprise data which focuses on all murder related cases involving multiple defendants in the 
'Homicide' category of cases recorded by the CPS, the most recent being for the years 2012 and 2013. 
• Reports on several key performance measures across a range of business areas, including conviction rates, 
cases dropped, hate crime and sickness absence.
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6.3.2 Internal performance management  
The internal performance management system of the NPA requires review. There is currently little in place to 
encourage or reward performance within the NPA. Furthermore, there appear to be few consequences for failure to 
perform. Such a system might involve collecting feedback from a variety of sources, including peer prosecutors, 
supervisors, judges, defence counsel, victims, defendants, and the public.
123
 Incentives can then be devised to 
encourage success in these measures, to attract and retain good prosecutors, and to motivate them to succeed, 
through variable salaries, raises, and promotions. A great deal of consultation and thought would be required, 
however.  
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Appendix 1: Portfolio of the Portfolio Committee on 
Justice and Correctional Services 
Department of Correctional Services 
 Department of Correctional Services  
 Judicial inspectorate for Correctional Services  
 National Council for Correctional Services  
Department of Justice  
 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development includes: Courts and officials, Office of the State Law 
Advisor, Office of the Family Advocate, Solicitor General/State Attorney, Masters of the High court, 
Magistrates’ Commission 
 Special Investigating Unit  
 Legal Aid South Africa  
 South African Human Rights Commission  
 Public Protector  
 Office of the Chief Justice and Judicial Administration (the South African Judicial Service Commission and the 
South African Judicial Education Institute falls under this office) 
 National Prosecuting Authority of South Africa (comprising: National Prosecuting Service, Office for Witness 
Protection, Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU), Specialised Commercial Crime Unit, Priority Crimes Litigation Unit, 




 South African Board for Sheriffs 
 South African Law Reform Commission 
  
